Chapter

The i/f distinction: distinguishing intent from foresight

T. A. Cavanaugh

in Double-Effect Reasoning

Published in print August 2006 | ISBN: 9780199272198
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191604157 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199272190.003.0003

Series: Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics

The i/f distinction: distinguishing intent from foresight

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This chapter analyzes the intended/foreseen (i/f) distinction: how to name it, how to make it, and how to apply it to the classic cases of euthanasia/terminal sedation, craniotomy/hysterectomy, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. Addressing the problem of closeness Foot moots, inadequate responses to this problem are considered such as paring one’s intentions, the counter-factual test, and conceptual necessity. The chapter presents an account of the i/f distinction based on the resources found in Aquinas, Anscombe, and Bratman who indicate how intention characteristically differs from foresight insofar as the former is while the latter is not a plan of action formed in deliberation embodying practical knowledge.

Keywords: Anscombe; Aquinas; Bratman; deliberation; double effect; Foot; intended distinction; foreseen distinction; intention; foresight

Chapter.  12724 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Religion

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