Chapter

VALUE, JUDGEMENT, AND DESIRE: BRIDGING THE GAPS

GRAHAM ODDIE

in Value, Reality, and Desire

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780199273416
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602658 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199273413.003.0008
 						VALUE, JUDGEMENT, AND DESIRE: BRIDGING THE GAPS

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This chapter presents a different and complementary take on the nature of realism and antirealism, one which has a clearer application to value when our journey is almost over than it would have here just as we embark. It argues that realism can be characterized as the affirmation of three important logical gaps. First, there is the gap between appearance and reality — the logical gap which constitutes the possibility of illusion or distortion. Second, there is the gap between reality and belief — the logical gap which constitutes the possibility of error. Third, there is the gap between appearance and belief — the logical gap which constitutes the possibility of incoherence between percept and concept. Various versions of antirealism try to close these gaps, thereby handily blocking the possibility of a certain kind of shortcoming.

Keywords: realism; antirealism; reality; appearance; belief

Chapter.  9052 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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