Chapter

The Community Method

Giandomenico Majone

in Dilemmas of European Integration

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780199274307
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603310 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199274304.003.0003
The Community Method

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The Community system is not based on separation of powers but on representation of interests. Each European institution is the bearer of a particular, national or supranational interest, which it strives to protect and promote. This makes the European Community a latter-day version of mixed government. The principle of institutional balance, typical of mixed government, entails the preservation of the relative position of each interest, and of the institution which represents it. This key principle, combined with the Commission’s monopoly of agenda setting, has become a serious obstacle to institutional innovation and policy learning in the EU.

Keywords: agenda setting; classical Community method; decision rules; institutional balance; interest representation; mixed government; separation of powers; supranationalism; unanimity

Chapter.  9332 words. 

Subjects: European Union

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