Chapter

Institutional Balance Versus Institutional Innovation

Giandomenico Majone

in Dilemmas of European Integration

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780199274307
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603310 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199274304.003.0005
Institutional Balance Versus Institutional Innovation

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This chapter discusses the delegation of implementing powers by the Council (or by the Council and the EP) to the Commission or to European agencies. While delegation to the Commission may involve wide discretionary powers, European agencies are denied the regulatory powers which national agencies normally have. The Commission uses the principle of institutional balance to impede institutional developments which would reduce its own role, but would enhance the credibility of European policies. The division of roles between the Commission and the agencies aggravates an already serious accountability problem.

Keywords: agencies; comitology; implementing powers; Meroni doctrine; non-delegation doctrine; regulatory networks; regulatory reform; rulemaking; self-regulation

Chapter.  9935 words. 

Subjects: European Union

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