Chapter

What is Evidence? Discrimination, Indication, and Leverage

Sherrilyn Roush

in Tracking Truth

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199274734
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603228 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199274738.003.0005
What is Evidence? Discrimination, Indication, and Leverage

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This chapter explains the motivations behind a tracking view of what evidence is, and formulates such a view in terms of conditional probability. This view is a likelihood ratio confirmation theory, which is considered superior to approaches using other measures of confirmation. Beyond confirmational support, a new constraint is formulated to put a lower bound on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. It is shown that knowledge, on the new tracking view, has a sufficiently strong transitivity property to explain why better evidence makes one more likely to know when to conjoin the tracking view of evidence with the tracking view of knowledge.

Keywords: evidence; confirmation; discrimination; indication; transitivity; probability; measure; likelihood ratio; deductive support

Chapter.  22555 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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