Michael Bergmann

in Justification without Awareness

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199275748
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603907 | DOI:

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This chapter argues against both mentalism and the mentalist account of internalism. Mentalism is the view that a belief’s justification supervenes on the believer’s mental states: holding fixed their mental states holds fixed the justification of their beliefs. A mentalist account of internalism says that internalism is equivalent to mentalism. In arguing against the mentalist account of internalism, the dilemma proposed in Chapter 1 is defended, which relies on that account’s falsity. Further support for externalism is offered, whose two main competitors are internalism and mentalism.

Keywords: basing; Conee; Cruz; Feldman; internalism; mentalism; Pollock

Chapter.  16120 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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