Epistemic Circularity

Michael Bergmann

in Justification without Awareness

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199275748
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603907 | DOI:
 Epistemic Circularity

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One prominent objection to externalism is that it commits its adherents to approving of epistemic circularity. This chapter explains and then responds to this objection by giving two arguments for the conclusion that we should sometimes approve of epistemic circularity, that being committed to approving of it is not, in itself, a defect of externalism. It then explains why approving of epistemic circularity misleadingly seems like a defect, and how epistemic circularity is likely to occur in an acceptable manner.

Keywords: common sense; epistemic circularity; externalism; foundationalism; Reid

Chapter.  17136 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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