Multiple Objects

Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro

in An Introduction to Auction Theory

Published in print November 2004 | ISBN: 9780199275984
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602214 | DOI:
Multiple Objects

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This chapter analyses the problems in developing a general theory of multiple-object auctions. Sequential second-price auctions and discriminatory and uniform auctions are examined. The optimal auction is characterized, and its expected revenue is compared with that of standard auction formats.

Keywords: multiple object auctions; second-price auctions; discriminatory auctions; uniform auctions; optimal auction; revenues

Chapter.  12571 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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