Ingmar Persson

in The Retreat of Reason

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199276905
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603198 | DOI:

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This chapter explains some distinctions which are central in the theory of practical reasons and value, namely the distinction between objectivism and subjectivism, and the distinction between externalism and internalism. Subjectivist theories take reasons and values to be definable in terms of some relation to desires and/or emotions had under some factually described circumstances. Objectivist theories deny either only the sufficiency of such a condition or both its sufficiency and necessity. By virtue of accepting the necessity of this sort of dependence upon attitudes, subjectivist theories are perforce internalist, whereas objectivist theories could be either internalist or externalist, depending on whether they accept the necessity of this link to attitudes. Objectivism is then distinguished both from inter-subjectivism and realism, which views reasons and values as irreducible.

Keywords: externalism; internalism; inter-subjectivism; objectivism; practical reasons; realism; subjectivism; value

Chapter.  6405 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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