Chapter

THE RATIONALITY OF PARA-COGNITIVE ATTITUDES

Ingmar Persson

in The Retreat of Reason

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199276905
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603198 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199276900.003.0012
 							THE RATIONALITY OF PARA-COGNITIVE ATTITUDES

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This chapter explains that according to subjectivism, a desire can be rationally required only relative to some other desire. Thus, only derivative desires can be rationally required; intrinsic desires can only be rational in the sense of not being irrational. It is pointed how this account of the rationality of desires is superior to the similar account given by Richard Brandt, but the latter is also defended against some criticisms that have been levelled against it. Two notions of rational thinking are also distinguished. The chapter closes with a summary of the kinds of reasons which have been discussed in part II of this book.

Keywords: Richard Brandt; intrinsic desires; rational desires; rational thinking; reasons; subjectivism

Chapter.  5340 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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