Chapter

THE DEONTOLOGICAL ELEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

Ingmar Persson

in The Retreat of Reason

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199276905
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603198 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199276900.003.0036
 							THE DEONTOLOGICAL ELEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

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This chapter focuses on two doctrines that make up deontology: the act-omission doctrine and the doctrine of the double effect. Some arguments against these doctrines are sketched. The main point is that the tenability of these deontological doctrines is not of great moment for this book. If they are false, it would follow that we could be as much responsible for what we let happen as for what we do, and for what we do with foresight as for what we do with intention. But the feasibility of extending our desert-entailing responsibility reactions in these two ways is not of much interest if it is the case, as this part of the book argues, that we are rationally obliged to dispose of these reactions entirely. It is also suggested that the idea of responsibility underlying these deontological doctrines is the idea of ultimate responsibility.

Keywords: act-omission doctrine; deontology; doctrine of the double effect; responsibility; ultimate responsibility

Chapter.  5843 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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