Chapter

Natural Theories of Consciousness

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199277360
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602597 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199277362.003.0003
Natural Theories of Consciousness

Show Summary Details

Preview

Works its way through a variety of different accounts of phenomenal consciousness, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each. At the heart of the chapter is an extended critical examination of first-order representational (FOR) theories, of the sort espoused by Dretske and Tye, arguing that they are inferior to higher-order representational (HOR) accounts. Acknowledges as a problem for HOR theories that they might withhold phenomenal consciousness from most other species of animal, but claims that this problem should not be regarded as a serious obstacle to the acceptance of some such theory. Different versions of HOR theory are discussed, and the author’s own account (dual-content theory, here called dispositional higher-order thought theory) is briefly elaborated and defended.

Keywords: animal consciousness Dretske; dual-content theory; dispositional higher-order thought; higher-order representationalism; first-order representationalism; phenomenal consciousness; Tye

Chapter.  12424 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.