Chapter

Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

Peter Carruthers

in Consciousness

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199277360
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602597 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199277362.003.0006
Dual-Content Theory: the Explanatory Advantages

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Presents and develops what the author takes to be the main argument, both against the most plausible version of first-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness, and in support of his own higher-order perception/dual-content account. The primary goal of the chapter is to lay out the case for saying that dual-content theory (but not first-order theory) provides us with a successful reductive explanation of the various puzzling features of phenomenal consciousness. Also takes up the question whether a first-order theorist can also accept the higher-order analogue contents postulated by dual-content theory, and can thereby obtain all of the advantages of the latter, while retaining their distinctively first-order account of phenomenal consciousness itself. It returns a negative answer.

Keywords: dual content theory; first-order representationalism; higher-order perception; phenomenal consciousness; reductive explanation

Chapter.  8524 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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