Chapter

Incentives for Contractors in Aid-Supported Activities

Clark C. Gibson

in The Samaritan's Dilemma

Published in print September 2005 | ISBN: 9780199278855
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602863 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199278857.003.0008
 Incentives for Contractors in Aid-Supported Activities

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Using data on Sida’s activities in Zambia and India, it is shown that there are inherent contradictions between the incentives that consultants face in promoting ownership, and the incentives they face in retaining control of a project. Control over project decisions may produce positive short-term project results that please Sida, but contractors’ control may also compromise the prospects for sustainability. It is argued that donor agencies can improve aid sustainability by combining consultant expertise with the local knowledge of local beneficiaries — knowledge that donors frequently declare to be critical, but nevertheless, tend to neglect or underutilize. This calls for assigning a greater role to beneficiary organizations in the design, implementation, and evaluation of donor-financed field activities.

Keywords: contractors; consultants; ownership; Sida; Zambia; India

Chapter.  4817 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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