Mechanism Design

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI:
 Mechanism Design

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Mechanism Design is introduced, The key classifications of complete and incomplete information are given and the revelation principle is described. Direct mechanisms and dominant strategy implementation are discussed. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and some positive results are given—for single peaked and quasi-linear preferences.

Keywords: complete information environments; Gibbard–Satterthwaite; implementation; incomplete information environments; mechanisms; strategy-proofness; theorem

Chapter.  8970 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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