Chapter

Implementation: Complete and Incomplete Information

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199280290.003.0006
 Implementation: Complete and Incomplete Information

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Considers complete and incomplete information implementation in both strategic and extensive form games. A variety of solution concepts are used—Nash, undominated Nash, virtual implementation, and subgame perfection. The key ideas on monotonicity and Bayesian monotonicity are explained and highlight the essential role of preference reversals in designing implementing mechanisms. Also frames the discussion for mechanisms based on other solution concepts or games forms.

Keywords: Bayesian monotonicity; implementation; monotonocity; subgame perfect inmplementation; undominated Nash implementation; virtual implementation

Chapter.  10087 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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