Auctions I: Independent Values

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI:
 Auctions I: Independent Values

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Auctions with independent values are described. Detailed calculations of equilibrium strategies are given for the standard auctions (first price, second price, and so on.) The fundamental revenue equivalence theorem is illustrated by computing expected revenue for five different types of auction. Optimal auctions are described. The impact of risk aversion is considered in the first price auction.

Keywords: bidding and risk aversion; canonical prices; Dutch auction; English auction; First price auction; optimal auctions; second price auction

Chapter.  12283 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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