Chapter

Auctions II: Dependent Values

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199280290.003.0008
 Auctions II: Dependent Values

Show Summary Details

Preview

Considers auctions with non-independent valuations. Equilibrium bidding behaviour in the first price, second price, and English auctions is characterized. Revenue comparisons are given, showing that the revenue equivalence theorem fails for the standard auctions when values are correlated. The linkage principle (price is positively ‘linked’ to information) is described. Finally, full surplus extraction is discussed at length.

Keywords: Affiliated values; first price auction; optimal auctions; second price auction; surplus extraction; the linkage principle; the winners curse

Chapter.  17577 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.