Extensive Form Games

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI:
 Extensive Form Games

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Introduces extensive form games. Informations structures—perfect, imperfect, and incomplete information are explained. Pure behavioural and mixed strategies are defined. Finally, perfect recall and the equivalence of mixed and behavioural strategies (in terms of end point distributions) is considered.

Keywords: behavioural strategies; extensive form games; mixed strategies; perfect recall; pure strategies

Chapter.  4951 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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