Repeated Games

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI:
 Repeated Games

Show Summary Details


Repeated games are considered. The discussion explains issues surrounding randomization, observability, feasibility, and convexity. Games with pay-off averaging and discounting are examined, along with finitely repeated games. The ‘no-gain-from-one-shot-deviation’ property of games with continuous pay-offs is discussed and the proof sketched. Finally, games of incomplete information are introduced.

Keywords: dimensionality; discounted pay-offs; incomplete information games; folk theorem; limit of means

Chapter.  13030 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.