Cooperative Outcomes

James Bergin

in Microeconomic Theory

Published in print May 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280292
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602498 | DOI:
 Cooperative Outcomes

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Cooperative games are considered. The Core is introduced and the key idea behind non-emptiness (balancedness) is explained through the dual programme. Following this, vonNeumann–Morgenstern solutions are discussed, and vonNeumann–Morgenstern stability is defined. Concludes with a description of the Shapley value.

Keywords: Core; Shapley value; vonNeumann–Morgenstern solution

Chapter.  6851 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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