Scepticism in Contemporary Debate

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280384
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602290 | DOI:
Scepticism in Contemporary Debate

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I examine one key way in which the problem of radical scepticism is motivated via an appeal to an infallibility thesis—as expressed, for example, in the work of Peter Unger—and highlight how this construal of the sceptical problem presupposes a certain view about epistemic luck. Furthermore, I explore the manner in which an infallibilism-based scepticism gives rise to the kind of template-sceptical argument that is the focus of much of the contemporary discussion of scepticism and which turns on the ‘closure’ principle that knowledge is ‘closed’ under known entailments.

Keywords: certainty; closure; principle of; epistemic luck; epistemology; infallibilism; scepticism

Chapter.  8493 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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