Chapter

Closure and Context

Duncan Pritchard

in Epistemic Luck

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780199280384
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602290 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019928038X.003.0003
Closure and Context

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I critically examine two of the main responses to the closure-based sceptical argument. In particular, I look at the case that has been made for the rejection of closure by, for example, Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, and examine the so-called ‘sensitivity’ condition on knowledge that they advocate in this respect. I then evaluate this approach in the light of the attributer contextualist response to scepticism, as developed by such figures as Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose and David Lewis. In both cases I argue that these anti-sceptical approaches suffer by being motivated by diverse and incompatible intuitions, principally as regards their ambivalent endorsement of epistemological externalism. An exploration of the relationship between the sceptical problem and the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction is thus presented.

Keywords: closure; principle of; contextualism; epistemic externalism/internalism; epistemology; relevant alternatives; scepticism; sensitivity; principle of

Chapter.  15798 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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