Chapter

The Consistency of Scepticism and Knowledge

Bryan Frances

in Scepticism Comes Alive

Published in print June 2005 | ISBN: 9780199282135
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602917 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199282137.003.0008
The Consistency of Scepticism and Knowledge

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It isn’t clear what scepticism really is. Perhaps it’s the thesis that certain knowledge attributions are false. Then again, it might be that even though knowledge attributions are true pretty much when common sense says they’re true, the facts that make them true are impoverished compared to what anyone thought. For instance, if it turned out that all true beliefs had only piddling amounts of warrant and knowledge is mere true belief, then although knowledge attributions would be true, the sceptic would still win. These matters are explored and it is argued that even if live scepticism is false, since her central thesis ‘The overall warrant possessed by the beliefs targeted by the live skeptical hypotheses is anemic compared to that had by our other beliefs that amount to knowledge and aren’t targeted by any live skeptical hypotheses’ may still be true, she may still win the battle with the critic of live skepticism.

Keywords: scepticism; knowledge; justification; knowledge attributions; contextualism; relevant alternatives

Chapter.  2962 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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