Chapter

Hybrid Moral Theories

Tim Mulgan

in Future People

Published in print January 2006 | ISBN: 9780199282203
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603624 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019928220X.003.0004
 						Hybrid Moral Theories

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This chapter applies Samuel Scheffler’s ‘Hybrid View’ to the morality of reproduction. It concludes that the Hybrid View does not provide a satisfactory account of our obligations to future generations, as it cannot accommodate either reproductive freedom or parental obligations. The Hybrid View fails because it cannot appreciate the collective moral significance of reproduction. This failure is shared by all other theories that retain the individualist focus of Simple Consequentialism, and thus motivates the exploration of collective forms of Consequentialism, which begins in Chapter 5.

Keywords: Scheffler; reproduction; prerogatives; restrictions; hybrid view; parental obligations

Chapter.  21229 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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