Chapter

Identity Facts (2002)

Nathan Salmon

in Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199284719
Published online February 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603235 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199284717.003.0011
 Identity Facts (2002)

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For any x there can be nothing y such that there is no fact that x = y and at the same time no fact that x ( y. For if there were, then y would differ from x in this respect: that there is no fact that x is it and no fact that x is not it. In this case there is a fact that x ( y. In short, identity is always determinate. This argument is defended at length against the most developed response to date, that of Terence Parsons. The proof is also contrasted with a similar proof due to Gareth Evans.

Keywords: determinacy; Evans; identity; Leibniz; Parsons

Chapter.  14592 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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