Chapter

How Duties Follow from the Categorical Imperative

Richard Dean

in The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199285723
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603938 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199285721.003.0007
 How Duties Follow from the Categorical Imperative

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Kant recognizes that even if one accepts the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, there is a further task of applying the principle to derive more specific categories of duties. Kant refers to the more complete system of duties as a ‘metaphysics of morals’. It is argued that the key concept in moving from the basic moral principle to a set of duties is the concept of Achtung, or respect for moral law and for persons who act on moral law. Unlike the proposals of some other commentators, the strategy suggested in this chapter does not depend on any brute claims about the value of persons, and so it succeeds in preserving Kant’s position that rational choice is conceptually prior to value.

Keywords: Achtung; duties; metaphysics of morals; respect; value

Chapter.  12469 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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