Chapter

Kantian Value, Beneficence, and Consequentialism

Richard Dean

in The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199285723
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603938 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199285721.003.0008
 Kantian Value, Beneficence, and Consequentialism

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In order to properly understand the duties that Kant thinks follow from the humanity formulation, it is important to keep Kant’s conception of value firmly in mind. If one fails to take account of Kant’s idea that choice is conceptually prior to claims about value, then it is easy to arrive at exaggerated conclusions about the duties that we have toward others. It is argued that this kind of mistake is the source of some commentators’ claims that the humanity formulation leads to a strong duty of beneficence: a requirement to treat others’ ends in the same way we treat our own. It also is a major problem in David Cummiskey’s arguments for ‘Kantian Consequentialism’.

Keywords: beneficence; David Cummiskey; duties; ends; Kantian Consequentialism; value

Chapter.  8347 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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