Chapter

The Treaty Participation Game

Scott Barrett

in Environment and Statecraft

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199286096
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602832 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199286094.003.0007
 The Treaty Participation Game

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Building on the information developed in the previous six chapters, this chapter develops a theoretical model of international cooperation by means of the treaty instrument. The focus is on explaining why treaty participation is difficult to enforce. The theory shows that a treaty sustains cooperation by transforming the prisoners’ dilemma. It also shows that there is a limit to how far this approach can improve on non-cooperation. The theory is illustrated by the case study of conserving anadromous fish stocks.

Keywords: payoffs; stage game; individual rationality; collective rationality; minimum participation; commitment; democracy; participation

Chapter.  13093 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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