Chapter

Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity

Scott Barrett

in Environment and Statecraft

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199286096
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602832 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199286094.003.0010
 Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity

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The theory developed in Chapter eight assumes that treaty participants always comply with their obligations. In this chapter, compliance is enforced endogenously. The main conclusion is that a self-enforcing treaty must enforce both participation and compliance, but that treaty participation is the binding constraint on international cooperation. If the conditions allow participation to be enforced, then compliance can also be enforced. The theory is illustrated by reference to the Fur Seal and Montreal Protocol treaties.

Keywords: compliance; enforcement; repeated games; reciprocity; credible punishments; monitoring; verification

Chapter.  12711 words. 

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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