Chapter

Realism and Objective Truth

Barry Taylor

in Models, Truth, and Realism

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199286690
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191604065 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199286698.003.0001
 Realism and Objective Truth

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This chapter begins by examining and adapting a characterization of realism offered by Michael Devitt, settling on an initial formulation of realism about objects of kind K as the doctrine that objects of kind K exist objectively, and explaining objective existence in terms of intersubjective warrant. Since object realism is an inadequate framework for the discussion of some debates between realists and their opponents, the apparatus of situations and facts is invoked to do justice. However, the argument discussed in literature reveals that the apparatus of situations is too fragile to bear any explanatory weight. The developing analysis can be freed from reliance on this apparatus by semantic ascent, where fact realism is supplanted by semantic realism. Realism is linked with a commitment to the applicability, across the field for which realism is maintained, of a concept of truth which is intersubjective, epistemically independent, and bivalent.

Keywords: Michael Devitt; object realism; fact realism; semantic realism; intersubjective

Chapter.  8918 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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