Formal Theories of Truth and Putnam's ‘Common‐sense Realism’

Barry Taylor

in Models, Truth, and Realism

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199286690
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191604065 | DOI:
 Formal Theories of Truth and Putnam's ‘Common‐sense Realism’

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This chapter discusses formal theories of truth: the redundancy theory and its ilk, distinguished by the attempt to characterize truth in terms of its structural properties, in the context of the position adopted by Putnam in his John Dewey Lectures, here styled ‘Common-sense Realism’. This position is described, combining two principles called the Thesis of the Internality (according to which the elements of a representational system are internally related to their content) and the Thesis of World-Embeddedness (which holds that content is dependent on the world in a more than causal way), with a formal account of truth. It is argued that Common-sense Realism, along with all theories comprising a formal account of truth, should be committed to the flames, because they are cut off from exploiting the Fregean model of meaning, based on a recursion on truth.

Keywords: Common-sense Realism; Hilary Putnam; redundancy theory; Thesis of Internality; Thesis of World-Embeddedness; Frege

Chapter.  6288 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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