Chapter

<b>Questions of Logic</b>

Maximilian de Gaynesford

in I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Published in print March 2006 | ISBN: 9780199287826
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603570 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199287821.003.0005
 Questions of Logic

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‘The guarantee’, or the claim that any use of I is logically guaranteed against reference-failure as a matter of the meaning of the term, is a myth. If security is a semantic truth, I cannot be a genuinely singular referring term. There is no argument for ‘the guarantee’, which is independent of ‘rule theory’ and ‘independence’. Even professed advocates of ‘the guarantee’ turn out to defend a non-semantic explanation of security.

Keywords: the guarantee; reference-failure; security; logical guarantee; semantic truth; pragmatic explanation; Anscombe; Strawson

Chapter.  7489 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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