Chapter

<b>Conclusion</b>

Maximilian de Gaynesford

in I: The Meaning of the First Person Term

Published in print March 2006 | ISBN: 9780199287826
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603570 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199287821.003.0013
 Conclusion

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I has the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of a deictic term. Uses of I share the referential security and identificatory ease of certain uses of other deictic terms. I has a distinct character within the group due to kind salience, expressive demonstration, communicative demonstration, and certain other features. These findings show that the whole standard account of indexicals and demonstratives, due to Kaplan, rests on two false principles and must be replaced. More positively, these findings offer new ways to explore first-personal thinking and self-knowledge, together with broader questions dependent on them such as practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.

Keywords: deictic term; indexical; salience; singular personal pronouns; first-personal thinking; self-knowledge; practical reasoning; belief-acquisition; belief-ascription; epistemology

Chapter.  5502 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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