Chapter

<i>Contextualism, Interest‐Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox</i>

Jason Stanley

in Knowledge and Practical Interests

Published in print October 2005 | ISBN: 9780199288038
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603679 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199288038.003.0009

Series: Lines of Thought

 Contextualism, Interest‐Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox

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This chapter discusses contextualist and interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox and the Liar Paradox. It concludes that a pure interest-relative account is completely untenable for such cases. Thus, Interest-Relative Invariantism is plausible in the epistemic case only because of specific features of epistemic notions.

Keywords: sorites paradox; liar paradox; Delia Graff; verb phrase ellipsis; Interest-Relative Invariantism; contextualism

Chapter.  7426 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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