Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil

Michelle Kosch

in Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard

Published in print May 2006 | ISBN: 9780199289110
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191604003 | DOI:
 Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil

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This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.

Keywords: Kant; freedom; evil; Reinhold; Schmidt; intelligible fatalism; categorical imperative; causality; autonomy

Chapter.  13444 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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