Chapter

Rules of Origin as export subsidies <sup>†</sup>

Olivier Cadot, Antoni Estevadeordal, Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann and Thierry Verdier

in The Origin of Goods

Published in print February 2006 | ISBN: 9780199290482
Published online May 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603471 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199290482.003.0006
 Rules of Origin as export subsidies  †

Show Summary Details

Preview

This chapter estimates the effect of NAFTA’s rules of origin (ROO) on Mexican access to the US market, treating ROO as politically-determined. Econometric estimates of bilateral disaggrated trade, with tariff preference and endogenous ROO as determinants, suggest that the creation of a captive market for upstream US intermediate-good producers is indeed one of the political determinants of NAFTA.

Keywords: rules of origin; endogenous protection; political economy; free trade agreements; regionalism

Chapter.  9766 words. 

Subjects: International Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.