Chapter

The Decision to Intervene

Michael Doran

in Pan-Arabism Before Nasser

Published in print April 1999 | ISBN: 9780195123616
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199854530 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195123616.003.0006

Series: Studies in Middle Eastern History

The Decision to Intervene

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Four days before the expiration of the Palestine Mandate, the Egyptian Senate met in secret. Egypt's prime minister, Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi, convened this closed session in order to announce the likelihood that the army would intervene in Palestine, and to request from the Parliament four million pounds to finance the planned operations. After stressing the necessity of halting the suffering of the Palestinians, al-Nuqrashi and Pasha also told the senators that the government had no choice but to honor prior commitments to the Arab League. Although nobody voted against al-Nuqrashi, his arguments did not convince at least one prominent Egyptian: The former prime minister, Ismail Sidqi, who attacked the decision to go to war by posing fourteen thorny questions to the prime minister. When considered as a whole, these questions, together with the observations that accompanied them, comprise a cogent exposition of the intellectual framework—the Insular-Egypt Strategy—that had given structure to Egyptian foreign policy during the premiership of Sidqi Pasha in 1946.

Keywords: war; Palestine; Ismail Sidqi; Arab League; foreign policy; Sidqi Pasha

Chapter.  14931 words. 

Subjects: Asian History

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