Chapter

Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self

John Bickle

in Narrative and Consciousness

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780195140057
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199847402 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195140057.003.0010
Empirical Evidence for a Narrative Concept of Self

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Supposedly, the sense of self refers to the person that we associate with much value. In line with this, the “narrative structure” is purportedly treated as more than just a metaphor, as Owen Flanagan asserts that the connectedness associated with a self or a life that is perceived to be acceptable involves an unfolding rationale. Our selves, aside from how these are being portrayed as the expression of a story, also facilitate both cognition and behavior. In this chapter, the author attempts to make use of empirical evidence derived from cognitive psychology and from the images of the functioning brain that would reinforce a narrative concept of self. While some evidence would suggest that the causal efficacy of our selves is to be considered narrative fiction, the author attempts to compose a hypothesis that involves moral training.

Keywords: self; narrative concept; empirical evidence; narrative structure; cognition; behaviour; narrative fiction; moral training

Chapter.  6235 words. 

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

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