Chapter

Self-ascription

Edited by Jennifer Radden

in The Philosophy of Psychiatry

Published in print June 2004 | ISBN: 9780195149531
Published online January 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780199870943 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195149531.003.0008

Series: International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry

 Self-ascription

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This chapter offers a brief philosophical perspective on thought insertion as a disorder or breakdown in the human capacity for self-ascription of one's own conscious activity. It begins by defining thought insertion. It speculates about how best to link the phenomenology or experience of thought insertion with neuropsychological research. It considers an epistemological or identification puzzle about thought insertion that has bothered philosophers of psychiatry and others, and shows how the puzzle may be resolved.

Keywords: conscious thoughts; phenomenology; neuropsychological research; misidentification puzzle

Chapter.  7927 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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