Representational Development and False-Belief Understanding

Janet Wilde Astington and Jodie A. Baird

in Why Language Matters for Theory of Mind

Published in print April 2005 | ISBN: 9780195159912
Published online March 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199847150 | DOI:
Representational Development and False-Belief Understanding

Show Summary Details


Language is crucial for the theory of mind because it allows for, and indeed supports, a separation between what is real and what is hypothetical or counterfactual. Language is a medium of representation and, in simple uses, linguistic representations code perceptions. Perception fixes content and mode/attitude together. In false-belief tasks, language provides a means for representing mental states in contradistinction to the evidence given in reality. This chapter hypothesizes that the change-in-location false-belief task will be easier if children hear about but do not actually see the object transfer (because they will not be misled by the salience of reality) and that the task will be harder if children have to construct their own linguistic representation of the false belief, in conflict with the information presented in the visual display. To investigate this hypothesis, children's performance on a standard version of the false-belief task (in which both verbal and visual representations were provided) is compared with their performance on the verbal-only and visual-only versions. Across the two studies, there exists no evidence that these manipulations have any effect on children's false-belief task performance.

Keywords: false-belief tasks; children; object transfer; linguistic representation; perception; theory of mind; language; content; mental states

Chapter.  10096 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.