Chapter

The Consequences of Board Involvement and Vigilance

Sydney Finkelstein, Donald C. Hambrick and Albert A. Cannella

in Strategic Leadership

Published in print October 2008 | ISBN: 9780195162073
Published online January 2009 | e-ISBN: 9780199867332 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195162073.003.0009

Series: Strategic Management Series

 The Consequences of Board Involvement and Vigilance

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This chapter picks up from the previous by synthesizing what we know about the consequences of board involvement and vigilance. The problem of appropriate measurement of board vigilance continues to slow down effective empirical work, but there is considerable potential for further development. The idea that board members are sometimes actively involved in strategy and governance has picked up steam in recent years, and is in contrast to traditional views of boards as relatively inert. Research has identified a variety of mechanisms through which boards act, many of which highlight the importance of studying cultural, network, and interpersonal issues related to board behavior. The net effect of this vigilance and involvement plays out in a variety of strategic and organizational outcomes, yet many of the interesting research opportunities focus on more analytical treatment of board effects. The chapter concludes with a short section on boards as supra-top management teams, an idea that continues to hold considerable research potential.

Keywords: board involvement; board vigilance; board effects; board measurement; corporate governance

Chapter.  16192 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Business Strategy

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