Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin

in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System, III

Published in print October 2005 | ISBN: 9780195162592
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199850495 | DOI:

Series: Santa Fe Institute Studies on the Sciences of Complexity

Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

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This chapter observes that models of social interaction are a special case of a more general game-theoretic model wherein players respond to the distribution of their opponents' actions. This general class includes local interaction games, random matching games, and games of incomplete information. The chapter uses this analogy to explore important analytical issues common to all three frameworks, including the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and multiplier effects in the presence of strategic complementarities.

Keywords: social interaction; game-theoretic model; general class; Nash equilibrium; multiplier effects

Chapter.  11602 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Economic Systems

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