Chapter

On the Probability of Panexperientialism

Gregg Rosenberg

in A Place for Consciousness

Published in print December 2004 | ISBN: 9780195168143
Published online October 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199850075 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168143.003.0006

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

On the Probability of Panexperientialism

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From a Liberal Naturalists' point of view, the class of cognitive systems supporting experience must be like human cognition in certain sophisticated respects. Robert Kirk's basic package exemplifies this intuition as well and proposes that these elements are necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness. Thus, in this chapter, the author explores the idea of finding appropriate fundamental laws that meet a set of constraints like Kirk's and argues that these are unlikely. It also aims to examine whether other putative fundamental laws would have a character or consequences less implausible than panexperientialism itself. Two arguments will be presented by the author in this chapter.

Keywords: panexperientialsim; human cognition; Robert Kirk; consciousness; fundamental laws; cognitive systems; experience

Chapter.  4725 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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