Chapter

Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

David J. Chalmers

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

Published in print January 2007 | ISBN: 9780195171655
Published online January 2007 | e-ISBN: 9780199871339 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0009

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

 Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

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Philosophers have reacted in different ways to the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. This chapter explores another reaction to the explanatory gap — those who react in this way agree that there is an explanatory gap, but they hold that it stems from the way we think about consciousness. In particular, this view locates the gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts of consciousness, rather than in the relationship between physical processes and consciousness themselves.

Keywords: phenomenal concept strategy; explanatory gap; consciousness; ontological gap

Chapter.  14899 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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