Chapter

Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity

Ned Block

in Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

Published in print January 2007 | ISBN: 9780195171655
Published online January 2007 | e-ISBN: 9780199871339 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195171655.003.0012

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

 Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity

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This chapter criticizes the property dualism argument. It argues that one version of the argument conflates two different notions of mode of presentation: the “cognitive mode of presentation,” which is defined in terms of its role in determining reference and/or explaining cognitive significance; and the “metaphysical mode of presentation,” which is a property of the referent in virtue of which the cognitive mode of presentation plays its semantic and cognitive roles. It also examines John Perry's (2001) book, which discusses both Max Black's argument and the Knowledge Argument as well as some arguments drawn from Stephen White's (1986) essay on the topic and arguments inspired by unpublished papers by White.

Keywords: property dualism argument; Knowledge Argument; John Perry; Stephen White; Max Black

Chapter.  33307 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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