Kissinger's response to the Indo-Pakistani-Bengali crisis shows how inadequately his grand design—the triangular diplomacy and détente—fit with the realities of regional developments in South Asia. In this chapter, the author provides a historical account of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 which is considered to be as one of the key regional crises of this period. It presents a detailed discussion on the ways in which the emergence of triangular diplomacy greatly affected American policy toward the South Asian subcontinent. Also, viewing the respective policies of India and Pakistan through the spectacles of Sino-Soviet-American triangulation, Kissinger managed to associate the United States with the eventual loser in the conflict.
Keywords: Kissinger; Sino-Soviet-American triangulation; South Asia; Indo-Pakistani-Bengali crisis; triangular diplomacy; détente; Indo-Pakistani War
Chapter. 15645 words.
Subjects: International Relations
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