Chapter

Rejecting the Process-First View

Christopher Mole

in Attention Is Cognitive Unison

Published in print December 2010 | ISBN: 9780195384529
Published online May 2011 | e-ISBN: 9780199872817 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195384529.003.0003

Series: Philosophy of Mind Series

Rejecting the Process-First View

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This chapter argues that attention is the wrong sort of thing to be explained by identifying its constituent processes. The argument draws on the metaphysical distinction drawn in Chapter 2, on evidence showing that some instances of attention are constituted by processes of ‘feature binding’, and on evidence suggesting that those same binding processes can take place without constituting attention, when they occur in patients suffering from unilateral neglect. If attention were a process-first phenomena then such cases where the facts about which processes are taking place fail to settle the question of whether attention is paid ought not to be possible. The chapter concludes by showing that a process-first view of attention is not required in order to explain interference between different attention-demanding tasks.

Keywords: feature binding; interference; unilateral neglect

Chapter.  5829 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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