Chapter

Arranged Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling

Indraneel Dasgupta, Pushkar Maitra and Diganta Mukherjee

in Dimensions of Economic Theory and Policy

Published in print October 2011 | ISBN: 9780198073970
Published online September 2012 | e-ISBN: 9780199081615 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198073970.003.0020
Arranged Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling

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In most parts of South Asia, patrilocal marriages and cultural norms indicate that the husband's family stands to retain a major part of any additional gain generated by an educated woman. This means that men are expected to have a strong incentive to prefer educated women as brides, especially given the significant returns to women's schooling. Parents of educated women should face lower dowry demands, and thus motivate them to educate daughters. However, the persistence of low levels of female education and available micro evidence on dowry payments both imply that such incentives are neither strong nor generalized. This chapter explores this apparent market failure by addressing the consequences of arranged marriage in India and discussing co-residence and female education.

Keywords: India; female education; parents; dowry; women; arranged marriage; co-residence

Chapter.  11258 words. 

Subjects: Microeconomics

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