Jonardon Ganeri

in Artha

Published in print July 2011 | ISBN: 9780198074137
Published online January 2013 | e-ISBN: 9780199082131 | DOI:

Series: Foundations of Philosophy in India


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This chapter describes the different applications of the argument that is designed to defend the existence of public conventions on word meaning. It addresses the extent to which the Nyāya mandates can serve as norms of correctness. Indian epistemology is a theory of the pramāṇa: the faculties or capacities which lead to knowledge. This theory is indeed concerned with the knowledge of truths. Furthermore, it considers three problem cases posed by Śrīharṣa. In addition, it explains the Nyāya theory of testimony. It is noted that this theory fits well into the epistemological perspective which sees knowledge acquisition in terms of an individual's possession of truth-following cognitive capacities non-defectively functioning in the absence of defeating conditions. Testimony principles are normative truths, truths which are consequences of rightness criteria for J-rule systems.

Keywords: word meaning; Nyāya mandates; Indian epistemology; pramāṇa; Śrīharṣa; Nyāya theory of testimony; knowledge; truths

Chapter.  12907 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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